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Abstract
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, malicious inputs crafted
to fool trained models. Adversarial examples often exhibit black-box transfer,
meaning that adversarial examples for one model can fool another model. However,
adversarial examples may be overfit to exploit the particular architecture and feature
representation of a source model, resulting in sub-optimal black-box transfer attacks
to other target models. This leads us to introduce the Intermediate Level Attack
(ILA), which attempts to fine-tune an existing adversarial example for greater
black-box transferability by increasing its perturbation on a pre-specified layer of
the source model. We show that our method can effectively achieve this goal and
that we can decide a nearly-optimal layer of the source model to perturb without
any knowledge of the target models.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples for neural networks are small perturbations of inputs carefully crafted to fool
trained models [19, 5]. In the context of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [10], adversarial
examples are non-perceptible perturbations of natural images, and they have been well studied in
terms of attack [5, 2, 16, 3, 1]. Concerns have been raised over the vulnerability of CNNs to these
perturbations in real-world contexts where they are used for online content filtration systems and
self-driving cars [4, 11].
Moreover, our current understanding of these perturbations is quite limited. In particular, they have
been known to exhibit black-box transfer, meaning that perturbations crafted to fool one model will
also fool another model. Though some works have attempted to shed light on this phenomenon [21],
many questions remain unanswered. In our work, we aim to provide more insights on this subject by
exploring how perturbations on a source model can be enhanced for greater black-box transfer. We
attempt to do this by maximizing their effect on one of the source model’s intermediate layers.
Our contributions are as follows:
∗Equal contribution.
†Equal contribution.
Preprint. Work in progress.
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• We propose a novel method, Intermediate Level Attack (ILA), that enhances black-box
adversarial transferability by increasing the perturbation on a pre-specified layer of a model.
• When attacking a model, it is generally effective to focus on perturbing the last layer.
However, we show that when optimizing for black-box transfer it is better to emphasize
perturbing an intermediate layer.
• Additionally, we provide a method for selecting an optimal layer for transferability using
the source model alone, thus obviating the need for evaluation on transfer models during
hyperparameter optimization.
2 Motivation and Approach
For the duration of this paper, we will focus on non-targeted image-dependent attacks. In a typical
attack setting, most methods, such as I-FGSM [11], PGD [13], and DeepFool [14], primarily focus on
attacking the last layer, with most loss objectives formulated directly in terms of cross-entropy with
the softmax output and some desired discrete distribution. Although these attack methods produce
transferable adversarial examples [21], they are not inherently emphasizing this property. Our attack,
on the other hand, focuses on enhancing transferability of the adversarial examples by perturbing
intermediate layers.
Motivated by [22], we view a CNN’s convolutional layer as having learned a feature hierarchy,
with the earliest layers having learned primitive features and latest layers having learned the most
high-level features. We hypothesize that for a given model the low-level feature representations are
similar to those of other models until they begin to diverge at a specific layer (when models learn
different representations of high-level features). Thus, we aim to find and attack the latest layer
at which the feature representations learned are still general enough to be found in other models.
Adversarial examples crafted to attack such an intermediate layer will be more transferable as they
effectively focus on attacking the internal representation that is common to most models.
Based on the above motivation, we propose the following attack, which we call Intermediate Level
Attack (ILA). We define Fl(X) as the output of layer l of a network F given an input X . Given
an adversarial example X ′ generated by attack method A for natural image X (generated after n
iterations)3, and a specific layer l of a network F , we aim to produce an X ′′ that solves:
max
||X′′−X||∞<
maximize disturbance︷ ︸︸ ︷
α · ||∆Y
′′
l ||2
||∆Y ′l ||2
+
maintain original direction︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆Y ′′l
||∆Y ′′l ||2
• ∆Y
′
l
||∆Y ′l ||2
where ∆Y ′l = Fl(X
′)− Fl(X)
and ∆Y ′′l = Fl(X
′′)− Fl(X)
(1)
In practice, we iterate m times to attain this objective (full algorithm given in Appendix A). Note that
the layer l and the loss weight α are hyperparameters of this attack. Also, note that • represents a
dot product. The above attack assumes that X ′ is a pre-generated adversarial example. As such, the
attack can be viewed as a fine-tuning of the adversarial example X ′. We fine-tune for greater norm of
the output difference at layer l (which we hope will be conducive to greater transferability) while
attempting to preserve the output difference’s direction to avoid destroying the original adversarial
structure.
3 Results
We start by showing that our method increases transferability for various base attack methods,
including I-FGSM [11] and I-FGSM with momentum [3]. We test on a variety of models, namely:
ResNet18 [6], SENet18 [7], DenseNet121[8] and GoogLeNet [20]. Architecture details are specified
3The attack does not have to be iterative, but in this paper we focus on iterative attacks.
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in Appendix B; note that in the below results sections, instead of referring to the architecture specific
layer names, we refer to layer indices (e.g. l = 0 is the last layer of the first block). Our models are
trained on CIFAR-10 [9] with the code and hyperparameters in [12] to final test accuracies of 94.8%
for ResNet18, 94.6% for SENet18, 95.6% for DenseNet121, and 94.9% for GoogLeNet.
For a fair comparison, we use the output of an attack A run for 20 iterations as a baseline. ILA
is run for 10 iterations starting from the output of attack A after 10 iterations. The learning rate
is set to 0.002 for both I-FGSM and I-FGSM with momentum4. The learning rate for ILA is set
to 1.0 (this value is tuned to exhibit near optimal averaged attack strength on transferred models).
Finally, we limit ourselves to generating adversarial examples X ′′ for natural images5 X such that
||X ′′ −X||∞ <  (we choose  = 0.03).
To evaluate transferability, we test the accuracies of different models over adversarial examples
generated from all 10000 CIFAR-10 test images. We then show that we can select a nearly-optimal
layer for transferability using only the source model.
3.1 ILA Targeted at Different L Values
To confirm the effectiveness of our attack, we fix a single source model and baseline attack method,
and then check how ILA transfers to the other models compared to the baseline attack. Results for
ResNet18 as the source model and I-FGSM as the baseline method are shown in Figure 1. Comparing
the results of both methods on the source model and other models, we see that ILA outperforms
I-FGSM when targeting any intermediate layers, especially for the optimal hyperparameter value
of l = 4. Note that after fine-tuning, the adversarial examples perform worse on the source model,
which is anticipated as ILA does not optimize for source model attack. Full results are shown in
Appendix B.
Figure 1. Transfer results of ILA against
I-FGSM on ResNet18 as measured by
DenseNet121, SENet18, and GoogLeNet
(lower accuracies indicate better attack). α =
3.
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Figure 2. Disturbance values
( ||∆Y ′′l ||2
||∆Y ′
l
||2
)
at each
layer for ILA targeted at layer l = 0, 1, ..., 6 for
ResNet18. Observe that the l in the legend refers
to the hyperparameter set in the ILA attack, and
afterwards the disturbance values were computed
on layers indicated by the l in the x-axis. Note that
the last peak is produced by the l = 4 ILA attack.
3.2 ILA with Pre-Determined L Value
Above we demonstrated that adversarial examples exhibit strongest transferability when targeting a
specific layer. We wish to pre-determine this optimal value based on the source model alone so as to
avoid tuning the hyperparameter l. To do this, we examine the relationship between transferability
and the ILA layer disturbance values for a given ILA attack. We define the disturbance values of an
ILA attack perturbation X ′′ as values of the function f(l) = ||∆Y
′′
l ||2
||∆Y ′l ||2 for all values of l in the source
model. For each value of l in ResNet18 (the set of l is defined for each architecture in Appendix B)
4Tuning the learning rate does not substantially affect transferability, as shown in Appendix E.
5Our CIFAR-10 images are normalized to be in the range [−1, 1] via the transform x/255−0.5
0.5
. Results for
different values of L∞ are given in Appendix D.
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we plot the disturbance values of the corresponding ILA attack in Figure 2. The same graph is given
for other models in Appendix C. We observe that for a given source model and given ILA attack (for
a specific value of l), the disturbance value usually reaches its peak at the targeted layer. Furthermore,
we notice that the adversarial examples that produce the latest peak in the graph are typically the
ones that have highest transferability for all transferred models (Table 1). Given this observation, we
propose that the latest l that still exhibits a peak is a nearly optimal value of l (in terms of maximizing
transferability). For example, according to Figure 2, we would choose l = 4. Table 1 supports our
claim and shows that selecting this layer gives an optimal or near-optimal attack.
Intuitively, we choose a layer with a peak because we want to choose a layer we can significantly
perturb. We choose the latest layer with a peak because since the noise (∆Y ′′l ) we are adding at the
layer is fairly unstructured (roughly random noise), passing it through the model will only dampen
it. Thus, choosing the latest layer will minimize dampening and maximize the chance that the
perturbation influences the model output.
Table 1. ILA Accuracies (with pre-determined ILA layers)
I-FGSM I-FGSM Momentum
Source Transfer 20 Itr 10 Itr ILA Opt ILA 20 Itr 10 Itr ILA Opt ILA
ResNet18† 3.3% 7.4% 5.5% (5) 5.7% 11.3% 7.4% (5)
ResNet18 SENet18 44.4% 27.4% 27.4% (4) 33.8% 30.1% 30.1% (4)
(l = 4) DenseNet121 45.8% 27.4% 27.4% (4) 35.1% 30.3% 30.3% (4)
GoogLeNet 58.6% 36.1% 36.1% (4) 45.1% 37.8% 37.8% (4)
ResNet18 36.8% 28.1% 28.1% (4) 31.0% 29.6% 29.6% (4)
SENet18 SENet18† 2.4% 8.7% 5.6% (6) 3.3% 10.8% 6.6% (6)
(l = 4) DenseNet121 38.0% 28.3% 28.3% (4) 31.6% 29.6% 29.6% (4)
GoogLeNet 48.4% 36.3% 36.3% (4) 41.1% 37.1% 37.1% (4)
ResNet18 45.1% 29.1% 27.7%(6) 34.4% 30.4% 30.2%(6)
DenseNet121 SENet18 43.4% 28.6% 27.8%(6) 33.5% 29.8% 29.8% (7)
(l = 7) DenseNet121† 2.8% 2.6% 2.6%(7) 6.4% 4.3% 4.3%(7)
GoogLeNet 47.3% 31.8% 30.6%(6) 36.3% 32.3% 32.3% (7)
ResNet18 55.9% 35.2% 34.3%(3) 44.6% 35.3% 34.5%(3)
GoogLeNet SENet18 53.6% 34.5% 33.3% (3) 43.0% 34.7% 34.2%(3)
(l = 9) DenseNet121 48.9% 29.7% 29.7%(3) 38.9% 30.2% 30.2%(9)
GoogLeNet† 0.9% 1.3% 1.3% (9) 1.5% 2.2% 2.2% (9)
Table 1. Accuracies after attack are shown for the models (lower accuracies indicate better attack). The
hyperparameter l in the ILA attack is being fixed for each source model as decided by the layer disturbance
graphs (e.g. setting l = 4 for ResNet18 since it was the last peak in Figure 2). For I-FGSM α = 3 and
for I-FGSM with momentum α = 5. “Opt ILA” refers to a 10 iteration ILA that chooses the optimal layer
(determined by evaluating on transfer models). Note that on the original model, ILA does not usually beat out
the baseline attack. This is expected since we are optimizing for greatest transfer, and the ILA objective does not
attempt to further attack the source model.
3.3 ILA on Channels
Further providing evidence for the effectiveness of our attack, we show that a modification of our
method to attack each individual channel of a layer outputs a perturbation that exhibits the greatest
transferability when attacking the most important channels (as measured by standard deviation of the
channel activation values across the dataset, motivated by [17]).
We modify the loss function to target specific channels instead of specific layers. We do this by
replacing Fl in ILA as the output of a particular channel, instead of the output of a layer. The
adversarial examples are generated on ResNet18 by targeting each of 256 channels in layer 3 of the
model. We then evaluate their transferability on a GoogLeNet model. The result is shown in Figure 3.
†Model that is exactly the same model as the source model.
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Figure 3. Adversarial examples are generated on ResNet18 by targeting each of 256 channels in layer 3 of the
model. We then evaluate their transferability on a GoogLeNet. In this graph, channels are sorted in order of
increasing error rate on GoogLeNet. The standard deviation of activations is shown, along with the smoothed
connected version (smoothed by the Savitzky-Golay filter (sliding window size 41, degree 2)).
The result shows that adversarial examples produced are more transferable when generated by
targeting channels with higher standard deviation measured across the entire dataset. Since the
variance of a channel’s activations measure the information it contributes [17], channels with higher
variance are more likely to contain information shared across models. This then shows that the
increased transferability attained by attacking these channels is a result of ILA disturbing the shared
information among models contributed by the channel.
4 Related Work
Most prior work in generating adversarial examples for attack focuses on disturbing the softmax
output space via the input space [5, 13, 14, 3]. Not many papers have focused on perturbing mid-layer
outputs, though a work that has a similar goal of disturbing mid-layer activations is [15]. It focuses
on crafting a single universal perturbation that produces as many spurious mid-layer activations as
possible. In contrast to our work, it does not focus on generally fine-tuning an arbitrary perturbation
to become more transferable, nor does it focus on exploiting properties of a particular layer. Another
work that looks at perturbing mid-layer outputs is [18]. It focuses on showing that given a guide
image and a very different target image it is possible to modify the target image to have a very
similar embedding to that of the guide image. Unlike our work, it does not focus at all on enhancing
adversarial transferability nor specific layer properties, but rather general concerns about internal
deep network representations.
5 Conclusion
We introduce a novel attack, coined ILA, that aims to enhance the transferability of any given
adversarial example. Moreover, we show that there are specific intermediate layers that we can
target with ILA to substantially increase transferability with respect to regular attack baselines. We
show that a near-optimal (in terms of transfer) target layer can be selected without any knowledge of
specific transfer models.
Potential future work can focus on perturbing different sets of model components (i.e. different layers
and channels) or further explaining the mechanism allowing ILA to improve transferability. Focusing
on fine-tuning perturbations produced in different settings (i.e. generative perturbations or universal
perturbations) and extending our method for targeted attack are also promising directions.
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Appendix
A. Intermediate Level Attack (ILA) Algorithm
Algorithm 1 Intermediate Level Attack algorithm
Require: Original image in dataset X; Adversarial example X ′ generated for X by baseline attack;
Function Fl that calculates intermediate layer output; L∞ bound ; Learning rate lr; Iterations n;
Loss function parameter α.
1: X ′′ = X ′ . Initialize adversarial example as X ′
2: i = 0
3: while i < n do
4: ∆Y ′l = Fl(X
′)− Fl(X)
5: ∆Y ′′l = Fl(X
′′)− Fl(X)
6: L = ∆Y
′′
l
||∆Y ′′l ||2 •
∆Y ′l
||∆Y ′l ||2 + α ·
||∆Y ′′l ||2
||∆Y ′l ||2
7: X ′′ = X ′′ + lr · ∇X′′L
8: X ′′ = clip(X ′′ −X) +X . Clip the disturbance
9: X ′′ = clipimage range(X ′′) . Clip image to within the natural range
10: i = i+ 1
11: return X ′′
B. ILA Targeted at Different L Values Full Result
As described in the main paper, we tested ILA against I-FGSM [5] and I-FGSM with momentum [3].
We test on a variety of models, namely: ResNet18 [6], SENet18 [7], DenseNet121[8] and GoogLeNet
[20] trained on CIFAR-10. For each source model, each large block output in the source model
and each attack A, we generate adversarial examples for all images in the test set using A with 20
iterations as a baseline. We then generate adversarial examples using A with 10 iterations as input
to ILA, which will then run for 10 iterations. The learning rate is set to 0.002 for I-FGSM, 0.002
for I-FGSM with momentum and 1.0 for ILA. We are in the L∞ norm setting with  = 0.03 for all
attacks. We then evaluate transferability of baseline and ILA adversarial examples over the other
models by testing their accuracies. We also compare with their performance on source model, which
is labeled by †, in a similar fashion.
Below is the list of layers (models from [12]) we picked for each source model, which is indexed
starting from 0 in the experiment results:
• ResNet18: conv, bn, layer1, layer2, layer3, layer4, linear (layer1-4 are basic blocks)
• GoogLeNet: pre_layers, a3, b3, maxpool, a4, b4, c4, d4, e4, a5, b5, avgpool, linear
• DenseNet121: conv1, dense1, trans1, dense2, trans2, dense3, trans3, dense4, bn, linear
• SENet18: conv1, bn1, layer1, layer2, layer3, layer4, linear (layer1-4 are pre-activation
blocks)
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Table 2. Accuracies after attack using ResNet18 as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18† SENet18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
0 12.3% 34.7% 36.9% 44.5%
1 12.6% 36.5% 38.5% 46.0%
2 15.4% 42.6% 43.8% 51.1%
ILA 3 12.7% 34.7% 35.0% 43.8%
4 7.4% 27.4% 27.4% 36.1%
5 5.5% 42.4% 43.2% 57.0%
6 6.0% 43.4% 44.9% 58.0%
I-FGSM 3.3% 44.4% 45.8% 58.6%
Table 3. Accuracies after attack using ResNet18 as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18† SENet18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
0 18.4% 38.3% 39.8% 45.7%
1 18.6% 39.4% 40.9% 46.8%
2 20.0% 43.3% 44.2% 50.1%
ILA 3 17.5% 37.4% 37.4% 44.2%
4 11.3% 30.1% 30.3% 37.8%
5 7.4% 40.1% 40.8% 53.2%
6 8.1% 41.6% 42.1% 54.7%
I-FGSM 5.7% 33.8% 35.1% 45.1%
Momentum
Table 4. Accuracies after attack using SENet18 as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18 SENet18† DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
0 33.4% 9.5% 34.7% 41.4%
1 46.6% 15.0% 47.7% 53.9%
2 49.6% 16.8% 49.8% 55.2%
ILA 3 34.3% 11.0% 34.7% 42.5%
4 28.1% 8.7% 28.3% 36.3%
5 37.3% 5.9% 38.2% 47.8%
6 36.5% 5.6% 37.5% 47.6%
I-FGSM 36.8% 2.4% 38.0% 48.4%
Table 5. Accuracies after attack using SENet18† as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18 SENet18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
0 34.9% 12.1% 36.0% 42.4%
1 44.9% 16.6% 45.9% 52.2%
2 47.6% 18.2% 48.5% 53.4%
ILA 3 35.3% 13.1% 35.5% 42.2%
4 29.6% 10.8% 29.6% 37.1%
5 36.2% 6.9% 37.1% 46.3%
6 35.6% 6.6% 36.3% 45.9%
I-FGSM 31.0% 3.3% 31.6% 41.1%
Momentum
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Table 6. Accuracies after attack using DenseNet121 as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18 SENet18 DenseNet121† GoogLeNet
0 37.6% 37.2% 12.9% 39.5%
1 54.7% 53.4% 24.6% 55.3%
2 42.3% 41.5% 16.4% 45.0%
ILA 3 39.4% 38.7% 14.1% 42.1%
4 37.6% 36.4% 12.9% 39.9%
5 30.0% 29.7% 7.1% 32.9%
6 27.7% 27.8% 3.1% 30.6%
7 29.1% 28.6% 2.6% 31.8%
8 41.2% 39.5% 4.1% 43.4%
9 44.2% 42.9% 6.4% 46.7%
I-FGSM 45.1% 43.4% 2.8% 47.3%
Table 7. Accuracies after attack using DenseNet121 as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18 SENet18 DenseNet121† GoogLeNet
0 42.3% 41.7% 20.9% 43.9%
1 53.0% 52.5% 27.4% 54.2%
2 44.4% 44.2% 22.1% 46.6%
ILA 3 42.1% 41.7% 19.9% 44.0%
4 40.5% 39.3% 18.4% 42.3%
5 33.6% 33.2% 12.0% 35.7%
6 30.2% 30.1% 5.4% 32.4%
7 30.4% 29.8% 4.3% 32.3%
8 39.2% 38.3% 5.8% 41.3%
9 41.9% 40.6% 10.0% 43.8%
I-FGSM 34.4% 33.5% 6.4% 36.3%
Momentum
Table 8. Accuracies after attack using GoogLeNet as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18 SENet18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet†
0 45.7% 44.5% 42.3% 6.3%
1 56.1% 55.2% 54.3% 9.4%
2 58.3% 57.0% 54.8% 12.7%
ILA 3 34.3% 33.3% 29.7% 3.8%
4 44.4% 42.6% 39.9% 7.8%
5 42.1% 40.4% 37.9% 7.5%
6 40.1% 38.4% 35.9% 6.7%
7 37.0% 35.9% 33.1% 5.4%
8 34.5% 33.7% 30.3% 4.1%
9 35.2% 34.5% 29.7% 1.3%
10 58.2% 56.8% 52.7% 2.0%
11 57.9% 56.1% 51.6% 2.3%
12 55.8% 53.8% 49.0% 2.5%
I-FGSM 55.9% 53.6% 48.9% 0.9%
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Table 9. Accuracies after attack using GoogLeNet as source model
Attack Layer Index ResNet18 SENet18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet†
0 45.3% 44.3% 42.1% 8.9%
1 53.0% 51.9% 50.9% 11.4%
2 55.7% 54.4% 52.7% 14.2%
ILA 3 34.5% 34.2% 30.6% 5.6%
4 43.6% 42.5% 39.9% 9.9%
5 41.5% 40.4% 38.1% 9.2%
6 39.5% 38.8% 36.2% 8.6%
7 37.3% 36.3% 34.1% 7.3%
8 35.2% 34.6% 31.3% 6.0%
9 35.3% 34.7% 30.2% 2.2%
10 55.4% 54.2% 49.6% 2.9%
11 55.0% 53.5% 49.0% 3.1%
12 53.1% 51.4% 46.9% 3.3%
I-FGSM 44.6% 43.0% 38.9% 1.5%
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Figure 4. Visualizations for the data in previous tables.
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C. Disturbance Graphs
In this experiment, we used the same setting as our main experiment in Appendix B to generate
adversarial examples, with only I-FGSM used as the baseline attack. The average disturbance of
each set of adversarial examples is calculated at each layer. We repeated the experiment for all four
models described in Appendix B. Observe that the l in the legend refers to the hyperparameter set in
the ILA attack, and afterwards the disturbance values were computed on layers indicated by the l in
the x-axis.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Layer Index
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Di
st
ur
ba
nc
e
Disturbance Graph on ResNet18
L = 0
L = 1
L = 2
L = 3
L = 4
L = 5
L = 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Layer Index
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
Di
st
ur
ba
nc
e
Disturbance Graph on SENet18
L = 0
L = 1
L = 2
L = 3
L = 4
L = 5
L = 6
0 2 4 6 8
Layer Index
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
Di
st
ur
ba
nc
e
Disturbance Graph on DenseNet121
L = 0
L = 1
L = 2
L = 3
L = 4
L = 5
L = 6
L = 7
L = 8
L = 9
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Layer Index
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
Di
st
ur
ba
nc
e
Disturbance Graph on GoogLeNet
L = 0
L = 1
L = 2
L = 3
L = 4
L = 5
L = 6
L = 7
L = 8
L = 9
L = 10
L = 11
L = 12
Figure 5. Layer disturbance graphs on different source models.
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D. Fooling with Different L∞ Values
In this experiment, we use ILA to generate adversarial examples with an I-FGSM baseline attack on
ResNet18 with  = 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05. We then evaluated their transferability against I-FGSM
baseline on the generated 10× 32 = 320 adversarial examples.
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Figure 6. Transferability graphs for different epsilons
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E. Learning Rate Ablation
We set iterations to 20 for both I-FGSM and I-FGSM with Momentum and experimented different
learning rates on ResNet18. We then evaluate different models’ accuracies on the generated 50×32 =
1600 adversarial examples.
Table 10. I-FGSM
learning rate ResNet18† SENet18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
0.002 3.3% 44.9% 47.1% 59.3%
0.008 0.8% 45.6% 46.8% 60.0%
0.014 0.6% 47.2% 49.4% 59.5%
0.02 1.3% 46.8% 51.4% 59.8%
Table 11. I-FGSM with Momentum
learning rate ResNet18† SENet18 DenseNet121 GoogLeNet
0.002 5.9% 35.0% 36.6% 46.1%
0.008 0.6% 43.0% 43.8% 56.1%
0.014 0.4% 43.6% 45.2% 55.9%
0.02 0.4% 44.1% 46.4% 57.2%
†Model that is exactly the same model as the source model.
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